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Preface
The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been mired in 
violence for two decades and continues to be plagued by rampant insecurity. 
Yet, the drivers of this insecurity remain poorly understood. The Rift Valley 
Institute’s Usalama Project (Usalama means ‘safety’ or ‘security’ in Swahili) is 
a field-based, partner-driven research initiative that aims to examine dynamics 
of conflict and violence and their effects on Congolese society. 
The first phase of the Usalama Project (2012–2013) focused on ‘understanding 
armed groups’ while the second phase (2015–2016) investigated ‘governance 
in conflict’. The third phase (2018–2019) explores ‘insecurity in the city’ and 
the role of state and non-state actors in the provision of security, and citizens’ 
perceptions of, experiences with and responses to insecurity. The third phase 
was carried out in partnership with the Bukavu-based Groupe d'Etudes sur les 
Conflits et la Sécurité Humaine (GEC-SH). The project is guided by a series 
of questions: Who are the main agents of security and insecurity in the 
city? What are the drivers, logics and trends of urban insecurity? What are 
residents’ perceptions of insecurity? And how do they deal with insecurity in 
their everyday lives? 
The project takes a primarily qualitative approach, drawing on extensive 
fieldwork by both international and Congolese researchers. Fieldwork for this 
report took place between March and April 2019. A total of 83 interviews and 
4 focus group discussions were conducted in Bukavu, complimented by the 
author’s previous research, and desk-based research with a variety of academic, 
government, media and NGO resources. Many of the interviews for this report 
were conducted on condition of anonymity. Therefore, identifying information 
is limited to a neutral indicator with a location and a date, e.g. Usalama Project 
III interview with police officer, Bukavu, 25 March 2019. In the course of the 
research, accounts of potentially disputed events were confirmed by multiple 
sources with first-hand knowledge of the events under discussion. 
The ‘Insecurity in the City’ phase of the Usalama Project is part of the 
Solutions for Peace and Recovery Project (SPR), funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).
Summary
• Despite their rapidly growing populations, cities have largely 
been sidelined in discussions about conflict and insecurity in 
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). But 
researching insecurity in cities is crucial to gain a better under-
standing of how state and society engage around key prerogatives 
such as security and justice. 
• Throughout colonial history, cities played a key role in devel-
oping plans on how to police and discipline colonial subjects. 
Some colonial policing practices have endured to the present 
day, while new ones have emerged since independence. From 
the 1980s, a shift in the social contract between the state and its 
people occurred, with the state progressively withdrawing from 
primary obligations, such as security. 
• Crucial to Bukavu—the subject of this report—are its experi-
ences of war, rebellion and occupation, in particular the Rwandan 
genocide and its consequences, and the Congo Wars of the 
1990s and early 2000s. A continuing rural exodus, growing 
pressures on urban land, dispossession and oppression by 
occupying forces and easily available small arms have seriously 
tested the social cohesion of Bukavu residents. 
• Facing growing urban insecurity, the residents of Bukavu have 
taken matters into their own hands either by engaging in 
criminal activities to survive or by mobilizing against them. 
Improvising, fending for yourself (débrouillez-vous) and taking 
care of oneself (auto-prise en charge) have become logics of 
personal action ingrained in the minds of the city’s 
inhabitants. 
• Insecurity is a fact of everyday life for most inhabitants of 
Bukavu. Two of its more turbulent neighbourhoods—Essence 
and Nkafu—display a staggering diversity in the forms that this 
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takes. Coping with this drains physical and mental energy, 
steals time, hampers mobility, triggers anxiety and under-
mines neighbourhood trust. 
• Some people also benefit from insecurity. Facing a state 
withdrawing from public security and a stagnant formal 
economy, many residents of Bukavu have carved out spaces to 
make a living where opportunities exist. This has led to the 
flourishing of a complex economy around insecurity marked 
by a degree of collective complicity. 
• Despite the daily struggles to make ends meet, the majority 
of Bukavu’s residents manage to stay clear of this economy, 
often showing considerable creativity and bravery in responding 
to its many challenges. There are, however, clear limits to 
what can be done to fight a system upon which so many rely. 
• Security has become inextricably linked to insecurity. At the 
heart of this system are the tensions between structural forces 
and the agency of the people who are affected by them. This 
has produced an ambiguous order in which a plurality of actors 
compete to achieve the near impossible: to survive, thrive and 
provide security all at once. 
• This report suggests five areas that should be considered for 
those working to combat insecurity in Bukavu:
1. Support and invest in the creation of safe urban 
spaces, for example, by expanding public lighting and 
closing down illegal brothels;
2. Commit to police reform. Past donor efforts have had 
some successes, and these should be built on, invested 
in and repeated;
3. Mobilize the positive potential of youth by offering 
alternatives to the economy of insecurity;
4. Build on local best practice when tackling insecurity,  
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reviving street-level neighbourhood security commit-
tees and reinvigorating the important role of low-level 
urban administrators;
5. Foster bottom-up social inclusion, including by 
creating safe spaces for encounters between urban 
security actors, administrators and local communities.  
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1. Introduction
Since the late 1990s, violence in the eastern Congo has drawn 
much attention from researchers, activists and policymakers. 
Land and identity, exploitation of natural resources, armed group 
mobilization, peacekeeping and governance are areas that have 
received most research. Much of this has focused on rural areas, 
which harbour armed groups, bear the burden of their violent 
activities and are prone to fall under their influence. Cities, such 
as Bukavu, have been largely sidelined in discussions about 
conflict and insecurity in the region.1 
The urban population in the Congo is the third largest in 
sub-Saharan Africa and is growing by one million per year. At 
the current rate, the number of Congolese living in a city will 
double in the next 15 years.2 Researching their everyday experi-
ences, which are considerably shaped by insecurity, is a crucial 
step to a better understanding of the urban, as well as overall 
socio-economic and political, realities in the Congo. Moreover, 
it is in the ever-growing Congolese cities where the state and its 
security services are most visible, where youth groups and civil 
society organizations are loudest, where trade and commerce are 
vibrant and where inequality is starkest. Researching insecurity 
in the city thus also provides valuable insights into how state 
and society engage around key prerogatives such as security, and 
what that may indicate about the workings of urban 
governance.
1  Exceptions include: Karen Büscher, ‘Conflict, state failure and urban transformation 
in the Eastern Congolese periphery. The case of Goma’, PhD thesis, Ghent University, 
Ghent, 2011; Gillian Mathys and Karen Büscher, ‘Urbanizing Kitchanga: spatial 
trajectories of the politics of refuge in North Kivu, Eastern Congo’, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 12/2 (2018): 232–253. 
2  World Bank Group, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo Urbanization Review: Productive 
and Inclusive Cities for an Emerging Democratic Republic of Congo’, Washington, DC: 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2018.
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Like much of the eastern DRC, many of Bukavu’s residents 
have been drawn into a flourishing economy of insecurity, which 
provides them with diverse opportunities to survive and thrive, 
albeit to different extents. At the same time, there is no shortage 
of community and state responses to insecurity. Brave adminis-
trators, police officers and civilians have come up with creative 
ways to face daily risks and dangers. However, investment in 
security comes at a high price and many such initiatives struggle 
to endure. As a police officer interviewed for this project stated 
intriguingly, ‘security changes shapes. It is a system.’3 Questions 
of what this system entails, how it functions and how to confront 
it, including the economy it has created, are becoming ever more 
urgent for researchers and decision-makers alike.
3  Usalama Project III interview with police officer, Nkafu, 14 March 2019.
introDuction
2. A History of Insecurity in Bukavu
Insecurity in Bukavu reflects the socio-economic and political 
context of the city. This has been shaped by its colonial history, 
the nature of governance and civil–security relations, economic 
decline, a shift in the social contract between state and society, 
and legacies of rebellion, violent conflict and occupation. 
Together, these factors underlie the specific landscape of inse-
curity in Bukavu. 
The colonial period 
Throughout the colonial period, cities played a central role in 
discussions on how best to police and discipline colonial subjects. 
This was no different for the Congo. Situated in the lush hills of 
the western Rift Valley at the southern tip of Lake Kivu, Bukavu 
was founded in 1900 as a military outpost of the Belgian King 
Leopold II’s Congo Free State. Its main task was to monitor 
German colonial expansion across the lake and the Ruzizi river, 
which now marks Congo’s border with Rwanda and Burundi. 
Initially established on the peninsula of Muhumba in 
Nyalukemba, the military post took a few decades to flourish. 
The contested border with neighbouring German Rwanda, 
coupled with the advent of the First World War, slowed the pace 
of European settlement. Resistance from the mwami (paramount 
customary chief) of Kabare, ruler of one of the most important 
Bushi kingdoms, also contributed to the slow pace of settlement. 
Bukavu began to grow in the years following the First World 
War, when its tropical, yet temperate climate and fertile soil 
started to attract colonial administrators and settlers. It was 
given the status of an urban constituency in 1925 and shortly 
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afterwards became the capital of Kivu district.4
Little is known about insecurity in the early years of Bukavu. 
It was, however, in urban settlements where the colonial admin-
istration was the most visible and where most Europeans lived. 
Despite intensely guarded racial boundaries, strictly controlled 
movements in and out of the city, and firmly enforced segrega-
tion policies, urban settlements were also where the elite white 
population felt threatened by the ‘African underclass’.5 Colonial 
policing was thus a project of containing a specific category of 
people and keeping another in power—a legacy that has proved 
difficult to overcome. For the Congo, across the colony, white 
administrators were constantly beset by anxiety and fear in their 
dealings with their supposed subjects. Faced with the creativity, 
elusiveness and resilience of those they had colonized, the 
Belgian colonial administration found itself in a never-ending 
struggle to categorize the population, enforce dubious laws and 
maintain public order.6
Insecurity after independence
The turbulent history of Bukavu since independence forms 
the immediate backdrop to the complex economic, social 
4  Canda-ciri Njangu, ‘La Résistance Shi à la pénétration Européenne (1900–1920)’, 
Lubumbashi: National University of Zaire, 1973; Gillian Mathys, ‘People on the move: 
Frontiers, borders, mobility and history in the Lake Kivu region, 19th-20 century’, PhD 
thesis, Ghent University, Ghent, 2014; Pilipili Kagabo, ‘Contribution à la connaissance 
des origines du centre de Bukavu (Kivu) de 1870 à 1935’, MA thesis, Lubumbashi: 
National University of Zaire, Lubumbashi Campus, 1973. 
5  Andrew Burton, African Underclass: Urbanization, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam 
1919–61, Oxford: James Currey, 2006. 
6  Amandine Lauro, ‘Maintenir l’ordre dans la colonie-modèle. Notes sur les désordres 
urbains et la police des frontières raciales au Congo Belge’, Crime, Histoire & Sociétés 15/2 
(2011): 97–121; Nancy Rose Hunt, A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies, And Reverie in Colonial 
Congo, London: Duke University Press, 2016; Martin Thomas, Violence and Colonial Order: 
Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918–1940, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012.
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and political factors underlying current urban insecurity and 
responses to it. Several of these factors are not specific to Bukavu 
but affect the country as a whole, such as the troubled relation-
ship between the security forces and the people, the nature of 
governance and the dismal state of the economy. From the days 
of the Congo Free State (1885–1908), state security forces have 
recurrently been involved in violent oppression, abuse and theft. 
The coercive arm of the state, the army and the police, has served 
to keep the ruling elite in power at all cost and enrich them in 
the process. From punitive raids against resisting villages under 
King Leopold II, to the forced mobilization of labour under the 
Belgian colonial administration (1908–1960) and the suppres-
sion of political opposition under President Mobutu Sese Seko 
(1965–1997), the security services have always been a central tool 
used by Congolese elites to maintain their grip on power. 
A second factor underlying the strained police–community 
relationship is the governance structure in Congo. It consists of 
a presidential patronage network, the central objective of which 
is the survival and enrichment of those in power. As a result, 
state institutions have become rent-producing structures, 
whereby public resources and positions are used for private 
purposes. The security services are no exception. Indeed, they 
have always had a penchant to live off the population not just in 
order to feed the established hierarchy, but also to nourish 
themselves. Consequently, a diverse set of extractive practices 
has developed, ranging from charging for services and inventing 
infractions, to stealing goods during raids and robbing civilians 
at night. Such practices are the product of both oppression and 
scarcity, simultaneously guaranteeing the survival of the 
patronage system, and state security institutions and their 
employees. Throughout history, state security actors have always 
also been actors of insecurity, undermining their relations with 
the population and triggering a profound crisis of trust and 
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legitimacy.7
A third factor is the rapid economic decline of the Mobutu 
regime from the late 1970s onwards. In Bukavu, as in other cities, 
a multitude of residents were forced into the rapidly growing 
informal economy, which became the real source of most urban 
livelihoods. It is in this context that Mobutu called on his subjects 
to débrouillez-vous (fend for yourself), also known as Article 15, 
referring to an imaginary part of the 1960 constitution of seces-
sionist South Kasai, which encouraged state employees to 
improvise in times of need.8 Article 15, however, has not only 
encouraged the private use of public functions. It also represents 
a retreat of the state from its official duties, including those of 
security, in which place a new socio-economic arrangement 
between state and society emerged. With insecurity worsening, 
and a declining state capacity to respond to it, people had little 
choice but to take matters into their own hands, which was often 
encouraged by state officials. 
In 1982 in Bukavu, in response to growing popular frustrations 
due to a series of armed burglaries, Mwando Nsimba, the 
commissioner of the region of Kivu (a Zairian administrative 
entity), told residents to defend themselves and take justice into 
their own hands—a discourse commonly referred to as auto-prise 
en charge. Residents did not hesitate to follow this instruction, 
leading to the rise and spread of justice populaire (popular justice), 
a practice that consists of a group of people beating to death 
7  Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984; Michael Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 
8   Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985; Godefroid Muzalia, ‘Insécurité dans la ville de 
Bukavu au Sud-Kivu: Perspectives historiques (1960- 2018)’, Bukavu: Groupe d’Etudes sur les 
Conflits et la Sécurité Humaine, forthcoming. 
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supposed thieves or burning them alive.9 
Auto-prise en charge turned state employees into common 
thieves and common civilians into police and judges. The logics 
of Article 15 and auto-prise en charge are manifestations of a major 
shift in the social contract between state and society. As the state 
has increasingly retreated from public life, it has given a licence 
to state employees to siphon off public funds and has encouraged 
its citizens to take security matters into their own hands. This 
shift has fundamentally blurred the boundaries between public 
and private, and obscured the responsibilities of security provi-
sion. It has led to the rise of alternative responses to insecurity 
and the proliferation of non-state security actors. The impact this 
has had on everyday insecurity is difficult to overstate.
Insecurity in Bukavu has been shaped significantly by the 
history of rebellion and violent conflict in the eastern Congo. For 
example, in 1967, Belgian mercenary, Jean Schramme, and his 
troops, who had supported Mobutu’s weak central army, had a 
disagreement over their payment, which led them to occupy 
Bukavu. After looting the central bank, and facing Mobutu’s 
US-supported army, they eventually withdrew after five months 
via Rwanda, but leaving behind arms and ammunition. In the 
years following their occupation, the first criminal gangs emerged 
in Bukavu and a first wave of what is commonly referred to as 
vols à mains armées (armed robberies) hit the city. 
Weapons left behind by rebels and mercenaries, along with 
the presence of idle demobilized soldiers, created fertile ground 
for this initial rise in crime. At the time, the response of Presi-
dent Mobutu’s security services was generally swift and the most 
notorious thieves were hanged in Bukavu’s biggest public square. 
Where state security services were too remote, the population 
9  Muzalia, 'Insécurité dans la ville'; Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘The Power of Protection: 
Governance and transborder trade on the Congo-Ugandan Frontier’, PhD thesis, Ghent 
University, Ghent, 2007.
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of Bukavu set up their own alert systems, making noise with pots 
and pans, or tam-tams and whistles, to mobilize neighbours to 
scare away robbers, a practice still in use at present.10
The Congo Wars and their aftermath
The 1994 Rwandan genocide and its repercussions in the wider 
region has arguably had the most influence on insecurity in 
Bukavu. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, including large parts 
of the defeated Rwandan army and the paramilitary Interahamwe, 
set up camp on the outskirts of the city. Fear and distrust spread 
among communities in Bukavu, with resident youths starting 
to patrol the streets at night. The First (1996–1997) and Second 
(1998–2003) Congolese Wars followed, inundating the country 
with foreign troops and triggering a rural exodus of considerable 
proportions. As a consequence, Bukavu had to harbour a fast-
growing number of internal refugees, straining its already weak 
economy and severely testing the social balance of its urban 
communities. In addition, the city was awash with small arms, 
adding an unprecedented degree of violence to urban insecurity. 
At the start of the First Congo War, youth and urban admin-
istrators joined hands with some of the Rwandan genocide 
perpetrators to defend their city against what they saw as Tutsi 
aggression in the shape of the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour 
la libération du Congo/Zaïre (AFDL, Alliance of Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire), backed by Rwanda and 
several other African countries. When the AFDL captured 
Bukavu in October 1996, several of these youth, commonly 
referred to as volontaires (volunteers), were massacred.11 
10  This and following paragraphs: Muzalia, 'Insécurité dans la ville'. A tam-tam is a 
large metal gong.
11  Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR), ‘Acteurs non-étatiques: 
Pratiques de sécurité et de justice: Matadi, Kananga et Bukavu’, No place: DAI Europe, 
2012.
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During the Second Congo War, Bukavu was occupied by 
the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed Rassemblement congolais 
pour la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy). 
Many RCD cronies started to buy up or simply seize land and 
property in the city. Coupled with the unchecked and 
sprawling construction of makeshift housing by those fleeing 
the war, this not only led to ever more expensive land prices, 
but also to a myriad of land conflicts with severe repercus-
sions for the peaceful coexistence of neighbours and 
communities. 
In the hinterlands of Bukavu, the RCD fought the Mai-Mai, 
local armed groups that drew on the idea of auto-défense (self 
defence) to protect their homeland against what they 
perceived as foreign invaders. These fault lines seemed to 
have found their way into the Bukavu security landscape. 
Some youth formed gangs to resist the RCD occupation. 
Others, such as the Armée Rouge (Red Army), collaborated 
with some RCD commanders, who supplied them with arms 
to engage in criminal activities. While not much is known 
about these early gang dynamics and their direct or indirect 
links to ongoing conflicts, there is no doubt that they contrib-
uted to rising urban crime and insecurity.12
In 2004, only a year after the end of the war, former RCD 
commanders Jules Mutebutsi and Laurent Nkunda seized 
Bukavu. Previously, Mutebutsi had clashed with parts of the 
Congolese army, which resulted in reprisal attacks that killed 
several members of Mutebutsi’s ethnic community, the 
Banyamulenge. With Nkunda’s help, Mutebutsi decided to 
occupy Bukavu in what both claimed was part of an effort to 
12  Judith Verweijen, ‘From Autochthony to Violence? Discursive and Coercive 
Social Practices of the Mai-Mai in Fizi, Eastern DR Congo’, African Studies Review 
58/2 (2015): 157–180.
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protect Banyamulenge and Tutsi communities. During their 
two-week stay, their troops killed numerous civilians and 
committed multiple human rights violations. Their occupa-
tion further undermined urban security and once again fueled 
violent gang dynamics, leading to a peak in urban crime, which 
did not abate in the following years. This period also gave birth 
to the first anti-gang groups in Bukavu, youth groups that 
tried to stem the tide of insecurity and then became persistent 
features of the city’s security landscape.13
Patronage and troubled police–community relationships, a 
distorted social contract and its manifestation in Article 15 and 
auto-prise en charge, and violent conflict and occupation—these 
factors may have their origins well in the past but the many 
strains they exert on urban communities are as real in 2019 as 
they were back then. They thus constitute the backdrop to the 
current forms and experiences of insecurity in Bukavu, as well 
as its residents’ responses to it.
13  Human Rights Watch, ‘D. R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu’, Briefing Paper. New 
York: Human Rights Watch, June 2004.
Box 1: Urban administration in the Congo
The Congo has 26 provinces, which are divided into 
territories and cities. A city is sub-divided into communes 
(commune) and a commune into quartiers (districts). Cities 
and communes are decentralized entities; that is, they can 
raise their own taxes and have autonomy in the manage-
ment of their administration and human, economic and 
financial resources. The city is headed by a mayor, the 
commune by a bourgmestre (sub-mayor) and the district by a 
chef de quartier (district chief). The mayor and sub-mayor are 
elected positions, whereas the district chief is appointed by 
the sub-mayor. There have not been any municipal elections 
in the Congo since independence in June 1960, however, 
which has led to recurrent crises of legitimacy in the gover-
nance and administration of Congolese cities. 
On the organizational and governance plan, the quartier 
is further divided into cellules (cells), avenues (avenues) 
and, sometimes, nyumba kumi (ten houses). The cellules 
and nyumba kumi, however, are not officially recognized by 
Congolese administrative law. Their heads—the cell chief, 
avenue chief and nyumba kumi—work directly for the chef 
de quartier. Together, these low-level urban administrators 
up to the level of district chief make up the cadres de base 
(figuratively, grassroots representatives). As their name 
indicates, they function as an important bridge between 
the state and its people. In 2019, they continue to play an 
important role in the governance of the city, including in 
the realm of security. The absence of municipal elections, 
however, and the fact that the cadres de base do not have a 
salary but live off (sometimes arbitrary) fees for administra-
tive services rendered has weakened their public authority 
in the neighbourhoods where they work. 
The city of Bukavu stretches over 45 square kilometres 
of land and is made up of three communes—Ibanda, Kadutu 
and Bagira—and 20 districts. In 2013, its population was 
estimated at 870,000. Reliable statistics on the economic, 
social and ethnic profile of its residents are hard to come 
by but their diversity certainly stands out. In 1978, there 
were already nearly 120 ethnic communities living in the 
city, of which by far the largest was and still remains the 
Bashi community, followed by the Barega and Bahavu 
communities.
Sources: Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Loi organique 
n° 10/11 du 18 mai 2010 portant fixation des subdivisions territoriales à l’intérieur des 
provinces’, Kinshasa: Cabinet du Président de la République, 7 June 2010; Journal 
Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Loi organique n° 08/016 du 
7 octobre 2008 portant composition, organization et fonctionnement des Entités 
Décentralisées et leurs rapports avec l’État et les Provinces’, Kinshasa: Cabinet du 
Président de la République, 10 October 2008; Democratic Republic of the Congo/
Prime Minister’s Office/Cellule d’Analyses des Indicateurs de Développement (CAID), ‘Ville 
de Bukavu: Fichde d’identité de la ville’, no date, <https://www.caid.cd/index.php/
donnees-par-villes/ville-de-bukavu/?domaine=fiche>; Republic of Zaire/Office of 
Research on Urban Administration, ‘Enquêtes démographiques: Ville de Bukavu’, 
No place: No publisher, 1978.
3. Everyday Experiences of Urban Insecurity
According to a local human rights organization, Bukavu 
witnessed 118 killings, 368 burglaries, 24 kidnappings and 14 
cases of popular justice in 2018 alone. These numbers have led a 
Bukavu journalist to call the city the ‘capital of insecurity’.14 As in 
any other city, insecurity is spread unevenly across its communes 
and quartiers. Nevertheless, its overall high levels of crime affect 
the daily routines of all its residents. 
Two Bukavu neighbourhoods are particularly known for their 
insecurity: Nkafu and Essence. The neighbourhood of Essence 
is made up of several densely populated avenues of around 
30,000 people and is considered the beating heart of political 
opposition and resistance in the city. Nkafu is one of the larger 
districts in the city, stretching over five square kilometres and 
home to roughly 85,000 people. Due to their geographic locations 
on central arteries of the city, and their markets, ports and trans-
port possibilities, considerable crowds visit both neighbourhoods 
on a daily basis. Taken together, their spaces, diversity and forms 
of insecurity draw a picture of everyday experiences of urban 
insecurity familiar to most residents across the city. 
Spaces of urban insecurity
Essence and Nkafu attract a daily flow of people from inside and 
outside the city. Sometimes referred to as mugu (Swahili; those 
who are distracted, not well connected), villagers from the rural 
hinterlands of Bukavu stream in to seek opportunities in the city. 
14  SAJECEK-Forces Vives, ‘Sud-Kivu 2018: 345 personnes tuées, 881 maisons attaquées 
par des bandits armés, 232 cas d’enlèvement et 36 cas de justice populaire en une seule 
année’, SAJECEK Bulletin Nr. 60, Bukavu: SAJECEK, 23 January 2019; Esther Nsapu, 
‘RDC: Bukavu est devenue la capitale  de l’insécurité’. La Libre Afrique, 13 September 2018, 
<https://afrique.lalibre.be/24320/rdc-bukavu-est-devenue-la-capitale-de-linsecurite/>.  
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They are joined by day labourers looking for small jobs, house-
maids going grocery shopping, gold traders selling minerals, bus 
drivers chasing travellers and tired city dwellers looking for a 
drink. The countless ngandas (bars), nightclubs and maisons de 
tolérance (brothels) in these areas provide plenty of distractions. 
In a city with such hustle and bustle, where people circulate and 
where money exchanges hands, ill-minded opportunists are 
never far away. Villagers who lack the intricate knowledge neces-
sary to navigate such spaces make easy targets. Police stations 
are few and far between. In fact, Essence has none. Several 
ngandas and brothels also offer hiding places for thieves and 
gangsters.15
Outside the lively areas in these neighbourhoods, insecurity 
thrives as well. In their dark and less accessible alleys, shady 
operators find places to hide. The forested zones of Nkafu provide 
a particularly favourable cover for bandits. Here, residents speak 
of discarded cars and abandoned sheds as security risks, in which 
the latter provide cover to surprise unsuspecting passers-by.16 
The combination of commercial activity, a large number of 
potential victims, suitable places to hide and find entertainment, 
and a lack of police presence, have made Essence and Nkafu 
among the more insecure places in Bukavu. They have become 
fertile grounds for insecurity and are thus often referred to as 
criminogène (French; causing crime). As a young resident of 
Essence explains: ‘A criminal is like a fisher. He [or she] cannot 
go fish where they know that there are fewer chances to catch a 
big fish.’ Essence and Nkafu offer many ways to catch fish.17 
15  Usalama Project III focus group with women, Nkafu, 8 March 2019 and Essence, 
10 March 2019; Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019 and 
Essence, 12 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing 
group, Essence, 10 March 2019.
16  Usalama Project III focus group with women, Nkafu, 8 March 2019 and Essence, 
10 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with pickpocket, Essence, 10 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019. 
17  Usalama Project III interview with young resident, Essence, 13 March 2019.
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Diversity of urban insecurity 
In Essence and Nkafu, the diversity of insecurity is startling. A 
youth from Nkafu explains, ‘Nkafu quartier is entirely insecure but 
this insecurity differentiates itself across areas. There are areas 
that are hit hard and others that are less affected.’18 In Nkafu, 
almost every avenue seems to have its own insecurity dynamics. 
Moreover, in both neighbourhoods, each form of insecurity is 
enacted differently. As one woman in Essence explains, ‘They [the 
criminals] compartmentalize their tasks. Everyone has his [or 
her] own work.’19
Nevertheless, several forms of insecurity are common to both 
Nkafu and Essence—and indeed the city as a whole. Markets 
and transport hubs, for example, attract a variety of small-time 
thieves. There are the pickpockets, known as deux doigts (French; 
two fingers) or misapistes (from the Lingala word ‘misapi’, meaning 
fingers) and the shamuleurs (from the Mashi20 word ‘kushamula’, 
meaning taking by force), who snatch handbags, phones and 
money from the hands of their victims. Many of them are maibobo 
(street children). In Nkafu, maibobo have established a strong-
hold on abandoned ships next to an illegal market on the shores 
of Lake Kivu. From there, they engage in a variety of activities 
from pickpocketing to lance pierre (French; throwing stones) at 
market women, who are then forced to take shelter, offering the 
maibobo an opportunity to steal their unattended goods. 
More violent operators prefer the darker alleys or early 
mornings and late evenings to work. The nyembese (Swahili; 
catching) or catcheurs (French; catchers) grab their victims from 
behind, using a chokehold, and then steal their belongings. The 
18  Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019.
19  Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 
2019. Also: Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Essence, 12 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with civil society member, Essence, 17 March 2019.
20  Mashi is a Bantu language spoken by the Bashi people indigenous to these parts of 
the eastern Congo.
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choqeurs (French; shockers), who are more violent, mug—or 
shock—people on the street. The mupangeurs (from the Swahili 
word ‘mupanga’ for machete) use machetes to intimidate victims 
and rob them of their goods. The oldest—and possibly most 
feared—form of insecurity is armed robberies, referred to as vols 
à mains armées. These perpetrators all too often get away with 
their identities unknown, which makes residents refer to them 
as personnes non autrement identifiées (people not otherwise identi-
fied). Worryingly, these nighttime robberies sometimes occur in 
the vicinity of police stations. Worse, some burglars wear army 
or police uniforms, which leads residents to suspect complicity 
by state security services, only further undermining their trust 
in them. 
Both neighbourhoods also have their fair share of incidents 
among neighbours, which risk escalating if not dealt with quickly. 
A common cause of conflict is encroachment on a neighbour’s 
parcel of land. If left to fester, such conflicts can lead to both 
parties resorting to violent means to gain the upper hand. They 
may accuse their neighbour of witchcraft, which in turn can lead 
to acts of justice populaire. Others may pay thugs or even members 
of the security services to rough up their neighbours. Jealousy 
between neighbours is another common cause of conflict, with 
similar risks of escalation. A resident of Nkafu explains, ‘It is 
mainly jealousy. You see your neighbour with a valuable item, 
for example, or you know that he [or she] has money. You 
collaborate with thugs to threaten them.’21
More specific to Essence are baswenai (Swahili; those who 
21  Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019. 
Also: Usalama Project III interview with member of civil society, Essence, 8 March 
2019; Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Nkafu, 9 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview 
with former cadre de base, Nkafu, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with male 
civil society member from Kadutu, Ndendere, 26 March 2019.
28 a system of insecurity
smoke snith), drug addicts who steal anything they can lay their 
hands on to buy an opioid called snith. Findeurs (French; from the 
English infinitive ‘to find’) also operate in Essence. They are 
swindlers who sell fake diamonds, jewelry or phones. Selling 
fake phones is also sometimes referred to as ‘Operation Guang-
zhou’, as many fake phones presumably come from China.22
Fraudsters also operate in Nkafu. Some women around the 
markets deal in counterfeit money, a practice referred to as faux 
billets (French; fake bills). They tend to use children to change 
their larger fake notes for real smaller denominations, for 
example, by purchasing goods from unsuspecting market 
women. In the forested hill of Karhale overlooking Lake Kivu, a 
phenomenon more specific to Nkafu is Tia Na Sé (Lingala; to put 
something down on the floor). It refers to a group of armed 
criminals operating in the shadows of the trees, who rob passers-
by by telling them to lay their valuables on the ground to escape 
harm. Another form of insecurity is called kabanga (from the 
Mashi word ‘mubanga’, a heavy-duty cord), which made waves 
around 2007. The cord was used to strangle victims to death. An 
urban mythology arose around this cord, ascribing it magical 
powers. Victims of kabanga were often found with missing 
organs, spreading the rumour that organ trade was behind this 
practice. Even in 2019, strangled bodies are sometimes still found 
in the forested areas of Nkafu or washed up on the shores of 
Lake Kivu.23
This enormous diversity in the forms and shapes of everyday 
urban insecurity has become a fact of life for the residents of 
Essence and Nkafu. The impact this has on their lives cannot be 
22   Usalama Project III focus group with women and youth, Essence, 10 and 12 March 
2019; Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Essence, 9 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with a pickpocket, Essence, 10 March 2019.
23  Usalama Project III focus group with women and youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019; Eric 
Batumike, ‘La criminalité à Bukavu (1994–2016)’, Bukavu: Institut Supérieur Pédagogique, 
2017.
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understated. 
The everyday impact of urban insecurity 
Urban insecurity affects everyday life in the city in many different 
ways. First and foremost, insecurity constrains mobility. Circu-
lating freely ends as soon as the sun sets and this restriction 
lasts until it rises again the next day. As a youth from Nkafu 
articulates, ‘It is impossible to pass the square [Independence 
Square] at 11 p.m. It is really impossible because if you do not 
encounter the maibobo, the police will be there and they will 
rob you of everything you have.’24 At the same time, insecurity 
makes certain places off limits, further reducing free movement. 
Women and youth describe a long list of places that are impos-
sible to pass or visit after a certain time—or at any time. Bars 
and their surroundings are high on the list, so are particular 
alleys and roads. Social events such as parties and weddings (and 
even funerals) must be carefully planned. Guests need to think 
about how they will get back home late at night, as thieves like 
to prey on returning attendees. A priest explains, ‘When there 
is a funeral in the quartier, people are afraid to go at night or stay 
together with the mourning family until late into the night as is 
our custom. Curiously, there are also some youth who come to 
the funeral and then follow people afterward to do their tricks 
[crimes].'25
Not just social activities are affected. One student says that 
studying until late at night becomes a security risk: 
To go read at the UOB [Official University of Bukavu] 
because we don’t have permanent electricity at home, if 
you leave the reading room at 10 p.m. or 11 p.m., you are 
24  Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019.
25  Usalama Project interview with priest, Nkafu, 12 March 2019. Also: Usalama Project 
III interview with cadre de base, Essence, 13 March 2019.
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blocked. You feel that you are unsafe. There will be 
police who block you, bandits and armed thieves, who 
you may encounter. So one feels blocked.26 
At the same time, the risk of robberies in the evenings 
also forces people to stop their work early. A young man 
who used to work as a cameraman at weddings had to give 
up his job as he was too afraid that his equipment would be 
stolen on the way back home.27 Market women and shop 
owners are also seriously affected. As they are forced to stop 
business early, they miss out on those who run their errands 
in the late afternoon and early evening. While this under-
mines their livelihoods, it also makes it hard for some 
residents to find food and house supplies at a later hour.28
Insecurity also causes uncertainty, which in turn discour-
ages any investment in the future—be this in terms of small 
businesses, manufacturing, agriculture or development. 
The risk of being robbed is simply too high. A former chef 
d’avenue (French; unofficial leader of the avenue) in Nkafu, 
for example, says, ‘Insecurity does not allow us to invest in 
our quartier. I had a shop close to the Wesha River but at 9 
p.m. bandits emptied it and took everything.’29 
In a country where most people do not have a savings 
account or insurance, and where many borrow money from 
26  Usalama Project interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019
27  Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 
8 March 2019
28  Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Essence, 8 March 
2019; Usalama Project III interview with priest, Nkafu, 12 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with resident, Nkafu, 14 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 15 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with priest, Nkafu, 16 March 2019.
29  Usalama Project III interview with former cadre de base, Nkafu, 13 March 
2019.
street lenders at exorbitant interest rates, such a robbery can 
have devastating repercussions, not only for the shop owner but 
also their family and friends, who may have to help bail them 
out of potential debts. Moreover, in Essence, the reputation of 
the neighbourhood plays out badly for its economic develop-
ment. Youth from Essence struggle to find work elsewhere in 
town because they are suspected of being thieves. Meanwhile, 
outside investors are reluctant to invest in such a high-risk 
neighbourhood.30
Worse, perpetrators seem to come up with increasingly brazen 
and mischievous plans. A gang of women operating in Nkafu, 
for example, has reportedly been robbing houses when parents 
are out working, telling the children they are part of the family.31 
Such incidents—and general insecurity and the constant menace 
thereof—can have serious psychological consequences. 
Witnessing, let alone being a victim of, theft and robberies can 
be traumatizing, and there is almost no one living in Essence and 
Nkafu who has not experienced insecurity. One woman admits 
that, ‘When your heart aches, it means that you are not safe.’32 
A civil society member says, ‘The majority of Nkafu’s popula-
tion is afraid of walking at night or in the late hours, and even 
during the day, because of the maibobo from Beach Muhanzi 
[Nkafu’s main market].’33 One of the young female civil society 
activists in Nkafu adds, ‘At night, one is unstable at home. 
People wake you up all the time, call you to say, “I am threatened 
at this place. I am blocked by the police.” And I don’t know how 
to put an end to these stories.’34 An artist from Nkafu 
30   Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Essence, 8 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with money changer, Essence, 9 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with taxi motorcyclist, Essence, 16 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with cadre de base, Essence, 25 March 2019.
31  Usalama Project III interview with respected resident, Nkafu, 14 March 2019.
32  Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 2019.
33  Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019. 
34  Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019. 
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summarizes, ‘If already, psychologically, one is troubled, if one 
doesn’t feel free, one doesn’t manage any more to do one’s 
chores because you say to yourself that you shouldn’t stay out 
late, otherwise you cross people who will hurt you.’35
Due to this fear and uncertainty, insecurity gradually seeps 
into the social fabric of urban communities, spreading distrust 
among neighbours. A youth from Essence highlights growing 
fault lines in the community: ‘There is also a lack of trust in the 
population. People fear each other. In the past, if one met one’s 
fellow neighbour on the road, one would undertake the rest of 
the path together. But today, one can walk with somebody else 
and suddenly, it is that person who tries to put you in danger.’36
Everyday insecurity in the neighbourhoods of Essence and 
Nkafu is thus best seen as a constant drain on the personal and 
social lives of its residents, as it takes physical and mental 
strength to live with the constant threat of danger. Moreover, 
insecurity steals time by shortening one’s day, it hampers 
mobility, triggers anxiety and slowly unravels the social cohesion 
of a neighbourhood. 
35  Usalama Project III interview with artist, Nkafu, 12 March 2019. 
36  Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Essence, 12 March 2019.
Box 2. Identities and everyday urban insecurity in Bukavu
Everyday insecurity is certainly perceived and experienced 
differently by different people. Identities matter in this regard, 
be they class, gender or ethnicity. Wealthier people can more 
easily respond to insecurity on their own, for example, by hiring 
private guards, building higher fences and travelling in cars, 
while poorer residents are more exposed and are obliged to 
mobilize among neighbours to respond effectively. The former, 
however, are not representative of the Bukavu population, the 
majority of whom live economically precarious lives. 
Women are more likely targets of some criminal operators 
than men as they are seen as weaker targets. Moreover, prevalent 
societal gender norms play into exposure to insecurity. Women, 
for example, are exposed to mugging when they fetch water early 
in the morning, when it is still dark and roads are empty. That 
said, they are certainly not only victims but also contribute to or 
are complicit in insecurity—as thieves and fraudsters, or as sex 
workers who protect their criminal clients. In general, however, 
both women and men seem to perceive everyday insecurity in 
much the same way, even if they experience its forms differently. 
Ethnicity is rarely mentioned as a factor in conversations with 
Bukavu residents about everyday insecurity, although it does 
undeniably matter in the urban politics in Bukavu. From time 
to time, it also emerges in tensions between the many displaced 
populations who have settled in Bukavu more recently, and 
those who were born in the city and identify more closely with 
Bukavu as their home. Overall, however, it is important not to 
misrepresent the salience of ethnicity in everyday urban life in 
a city marked by such high diversity as Bukavu.
In sum, everyday insecurity affects everyone to some extent. 
As a city resident, young woman and Usalama researcher 
summarizes, in Bukavu, ‘everyone dances to its rhythm’.*
* Irène Bahati, Usalama Project III analysis workshop, Bukavu, 29 March 2019.
4. The Economics of Urban Insecurity
Abandoned by the state and let down by a failing economy, many 
Bukavu residents, security services and cadres de base have found 
inspiration in the logics of Article 15 and auto-prise en charge. Some 
have come to understand that insecurity can provide a space of 
opportunities. As a woman in Nkafu emphasizes: ‘If there is 
insecurity, it is because people have no jobs and develop survival 
mechanisms, including theft.’37 Where the social contract has 
shifted, engaging in insecurity may have just become another 
such survival mechanism—and even an opportunity to thrive. 
The police
Similar to other public services in the Congo, the police work in 
challenging conditions. Their salaries are meager and often paid 
irregularly, while some are not paid at all. They lack basic equip-
ment from office space and furniture to means of communication 
and transport. These conditions make it difficult to focus on their 
mandated work. Moreover, many police officers are exposed to 
constant pressure not only to provide for their families but also 
for their hierarchy, a practice commonly known as rapportage 
(reporting). A police inspector explains, ‘The commander 
expects a report. Now this report happens to be money. Where 
do they [the police officers] find it? By harassing’; for a police 
officer, he says, ‘working is harassing’.38 
Generating income is a major part of police work in the Congo 
but this does not always consist of coercive harassment. Some 
officers rely on their social network of family, friends and 
37   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women, Nkafu, 8 March 2019. 
38   Interview with police inspector, Ndendere, 29 November 2016. Also: Usalama 
Project III interview with police officer, Essence, 29 March 2019. 
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colleagues to get by; others charge for or sell their services, for 
example, by demanding transport and communication money or 
fees to open a case. These practices allow police to survive while 
also pursuing their job. Sometimes, however, this is not enough 
to meet the demands of rapportage. Harassing civilians is often 
the only way to do so and has thus turned some police, particu-
larly specialized units such as those controlling traffic or rapid 
intervention units—into actors of insecurity.39
Similar to bandits, much harassment from regular police 
occurs at night. As a female civil society member in Nkafu warns, 
‘Police officers find people at night and start to ask for money 
and similar things.’40 Besides such direct harassment, police and 
other state security services engage in a wide range of practices 
commonly referred to as ‘coop’ (from the English word ‘coopera-
tion’)—win–win arrangements with thieves and thugs. Two of 
the most common coop practices are worth highlighting. One 
consists of charging protection money for illegal activities. In 
Nkafu, for example, police tax market women on a daily basis 
for them to be allowed to continue selling their goods on the 
street without a license or permission. In Essence, police are said 
to tax drug dens and brothels in order for them to continue 
operating. 
A youth from Essence complains: ‘There are the PM [police 
militaire; military police and part of the army] and police officers 
who go and tax the owners of these ghettos [drug dens]. So it is 
a question of complicity with this theft and the state also 
contributes.’41 Thieves and nganda owners, in turn, share beers 
with police officers to strengthen their social network—often 
referred to as parapluie (French; umbrella), which protects them 
39   Michel Thill, ‘Police at Work in Bukavu: Negotiating revenue-generation in urban 
pirate markets’, in Negotiating public services in the Congo, eds. Tom De Herdt and Kristof 
Titeca. London: Zed Books, forthcoming.
40   Usalama Project interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019.
41   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Essence, 12 March 2019.
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during difficult times (rainy days). An Nkafu resident says, ‘If 
you are friends with a police officer and you do something bad, 
you are protected by this police officer.’42
A second coop practice is to work directly with thieves and 
share the profits. At Beach Muhanzi, the biggest market in 
Nkafu, on the shore of Lake Kivu, maibobo work with both police 
and the marines stationed there. They steal goods and return a 
share to the police and soldiers, or provoke fights so that the 
police can arrest those implicated and release them for a fee. 
These practices are well established to the point that both the 
police and the marines each have their own turf, upon which 
neither encroaches. As a police officer remarks, ‘No police opera-
tion can be considered in areas controlled by the marines without 
their resistance. They protect these bandits.’43 Moreover, the 
same police officer says that the ngandas operating on marine turf 
are often run by their wives and are thus protected against any 
unwanted interventions.44 
Peddling authority 
The police are not the only state representatives who have come 
42   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women and youth, Nkafu, 8 
March 2019. Also: Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 
March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with pickpocket, Essence, 10 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with money changer, Essence, 9 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with cadre de base, Nkafu, 16 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with civil society member, Essence, 17 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with sex worker, Essence, 25 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with 
drug dealer, Essence, 20 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with police officer, 
Essence, 29 March 2019.
43   Usalama Project III interview with police officer, Nkafu, 30 March 2019. Also: 
Usalama Project III focus group with women and youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 26 March 2019; Thill, ‘Police at 
Work’.
44   Usalama Project III interview with police officer, Nkafu, 30 March 20. Also: Usalama 
Project III focus group with women and youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 26 March 2019.
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to use their authority to feed themselves, their families and their 
hierarchies. All state institutions took Mobutu’s Article 15 to 
heart. A police officer in Nkafu explains, ‘Since the 1990s, your 
weapon is your salary in the army, as well as in the police. This 
phenomenon also makes judges use their work to free those 
bandits for money, just like soldiers harass with their weapons.’45 
A youth from Essence echoes this: 
This thief already knows that if he [or she] gets caught, 
it is this or that attorney who will be able to help. That is 
how they know that they can pursue their scheming. They 
know they have their rear base. … We don’t know what 
complicity exists between the police, army and bandits. It 
is us, the people, who are the victims of that complicity.46
Releasing thieves without proper trial is a major cause of 
insecurity. It not only fosters impunity but also discourages 
residents from denouncing thieves due to the fear that the crimi-
nals will seek revenge upon their return—sometimes even 
against the police who arrested them.47
For the cadres de base, the situation is no different. These 
low-level urban administrators used to be crucial actors in 
securing their neighbourhoods, registering people coming in and 
out of their quartier, dealing with local feuds, mediating family 
disputes, mobilizing funds and organizing night patrols together 
with state security services. In 2019, however, in the context of 
a rapidly growing city, cadres de base struggle to keep up with the 
ever-expanding challenges. Similar to the police and justice 
systems, they have come to use their position to extract money 
from their fellow residents, for example, by demanding arbitrary 
45   Usalama Project III interview with police officer, Nkafu, 30 March 2019.
46   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Essence, 12 March 2019.
47   Usalama Project III interview with police officer, Nkafu, 30 March 2019.
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house construction fees.48 
Several cadres de base face a crisis of legitimacy: all of them are 
appointed and not elected; some are known for merely seeking 
rents, others for not doing much at all; and still others are 
completely unknown by those they are meant to serve. While 
there are exceptions, all in all, most are not very effective security 
actors. As one cadre de base puts it: ‘You cannot be interested in 
the security of the quartier if you don’t have anything to eat for 
your kids.’49 A resident of Nkafu repeats this perceived dilemma 
between security and survival: ‘Police and chefs de quartier inter-
vene only when they hear that someone wants to build a house 
or for a land conflict because they know that they will find 
something in terms of money. For the question of security, they 
are only pretending.’50 
In Nkafu, there is infighting between former and current cadres 
de base. Residents mention that a former district chief opposes 
the current one, which has led to a fight over their avenue chiefs, 
some of whom are still collecting taxes for the former district 
chief. This fight over taxes distracts them from focusing on 
security. At the same time, residents suspect them and other 
urban authorities of collaborating with the most infamous 
ngandas in the quartier because they are never shut down despite 
being havens for thieves and thugs. 
In Essence, the cadres de base of the districts of Cahi and Panzi 
48   Kasper Hoffmann, Mariève Pouliot and Godefroid Muzalia, ‘Constructed Anarchy: 
Governance, Conflict, and Precarious Property Rights in Bukavu, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo’, Congo Research Briefs 1, Ghent: Governance in Conflict Network, University 
of Ghent, 2019. Accessed 20 May 2019, https://www.gicnetwork.be/constructed-anarchy-
governance-conflict-and-precarious-property-rights-in-bukavu-democratic-republic-of-
the-congo/.
49   Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Essence 25 March 2019. Also: Michel 
Thill, Josaphat Musamba and Robert Njangala, ‘Kukufa mu gratuité (to die for nothing): 
Making a living in Bukavu’s police’, Polisi Siku Kw Siku (Everyday police) blog 1, 12 
December 2017. Accessed 20 May 2019, https://www.kpsrl.org/blog/kukufa-mu-gratuite-
to-die-for-nothing-making-a-living-in-bukavus-police. 
50   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women, Nkafu, 8 March 2019. 
 the economics of urban insecurity  39
are similarly accused of doing little to invest in security. A 
member of a civil society organization mentions that they are 
too scared themselves.51 ‘Fair enough’, as one cadre de base 
responds. ‘The police harass the population of Essence. It is a 
source of insecurity. I have already been threatened by the police 
at night. It was at 10 p.m. close to Chez Nestor. They wanted to 
steal my belongings but when they were told that I was a cadre 
de base, they let me go.’52
While persons with positions of authority use them as leverage 
to raise revenue in one way or another, others may simply benefit 
from the spoils of the Bukavu economy of insecurity as and 
where they can. 
The spoils of insecurity 
In many parts of Bukavu, insecurity is not just a part of everyday 
life, but has also become familiar in a literal sense. Residents 
of Essence know some of their neighbourhood thieves and 
the thieves know them. During a focus group discussion with 
women in Essence, for example, participants point out several 
pickpockets and fraudsters on the street. One of them says, ‘If 
you come to tell us you were robbed at which place, we will tell 
you who the robber was.’53 A youth explains that they grew up 
with some of the thieves and are well acquainted with them. 
51   Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Panzi, 27 
March 2019. 
52   Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Essence 25 March 2019. Also: 
Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019; Usalama Project 
III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 8 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 12 March 2019; Usalama Project 
III interview with cadre de base, Nkafu, 16 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview 
with civil society member, Nkafu, 12 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with 
member of youth policing group, Essence, 27 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview 
with police officer, Essence, 29 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with fuel seller, 
Essence, 31 March 2019.
53   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 2019.
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Some residents thus claim that being born and bred in Essence 
gives them a sense of safety. Thieves who know them would not 
steal from them, they say. That does not mean, however, that 
they are safe from the many criminals that they do not know.54 
Over time, this familiarity with and proximity to insecurity 
may slowly erode normative boundaries and lead to a certain 
degree of banality with respect to crime. Some of the Essence 
youth and women, for example, argue that fraudsters are not real 
thieves but rather con artists. A woman explains, ‘The findeur is 
not a thief. I come and sell you something. We find an agreement 
but I don’t give you the real deal. I give you something fake. You 
will leave with the fake but I did not rob you. It is your problem 
[that you bought a fake].’55 
Moreover, in a context of general economic deprivation, the 
demand for cheap goods is high. Those who buy stolen goods 
from thieves or complicit suppliers thus become an important 
part of the economy around insecurity. As some youth from 
Essence mention, ‘Here in Essence, there is much complexity in 
theft. Inhabitants here are negligent. They are people who buy 
goods from thieves. … That is the complicity of theft in Essence.’56 
A drug dealer confirms this, admitting: ‘When I see someone 
selling something and I ignore where it comes from, I buy it at 
a low price to resell it and gain something for myself.’57 At the 
same time, others acknowledge that this supposed complicity 
merely reflects the poor socio-economic conditions in which 
people live. A market woman explains, ‘We are all human. Can 
54   Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 8 
March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 
8 March 2019.
55   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 2019.
56   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Essence, 12 March 2019. 
Also: Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 8 
March 2019.
57   Usalama Project III interview with drug dealer, Essence, 20 March 2019.
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I refuse [such an offer of cheap goods]?’58 A taxi motorcyclist 
summarizes, ‘Everybody wants to be well off. We copy the life 
of others.’59 
While some residents may sustain thieves by purchasing their 
stolen goods, others go further. In some instances, people protect 
criminals from police arrest as they are either in collusion with 
them or dislike the police even more than the criminals. A money 
changer explains, ‘Everyone knows where these criminals spend 
their time. And in most of the cases, the police pursue them into 
some houses but the same population starts attacking the 
police.’60 A pickpocket admits that some people protect them 
because, as with the police, they also stand to benefit from their 
illegal exploits. 
If thieves have acquired some money, they share a beer with 
their friends in a nganda, who in turn feel a need to protect their 
sources of free beer consumption. Moreover, bandits are an 
important clientele of brothels and drug dens; and they are 
suppliers to kiosks and shops selling stolen phones, jewelry and 
other valuables.61
Facing the structural forces of state and economic demise, 
many Bukavu inhabitants—be they police, judges and cadres de 
base or thieves, thugs and ordinary civilians—have adapted to the 
shift in the social contract. Inspired by its manifestations of 
Article 15 and auto-prise en charge, they also have found a myriad 
of ways to make a living out of the few existing opportunities. 
This combination of structure and agency has led to the creation 
of a complex and flourishing economy around insecurity marked 
by a degree of collective complicity. Despite all the daily 
58   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 2019.
59   Usalama Project III interview with taxi motorcyclist, Essence, 16 March 2019. 
60   Usalama Project III interview with money changer, Essence, 9 March 2019.
61   Usalama Project III interview with pickpocket, Essence, 10 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with taxi motorcyclist, Essence, 16 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with cadre de base, Essence, 25 March 2019.
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struggles to make ends meet, however, the majority of Bukavu 
residents steer clear of the economy of insecurity—and even try 
to resist it. 
5. Responses to Urban Insecurity 
Living with everyday insecurity has given rise to as diverse a 
set of responses as there are forms of crime. As much as they 
work in negative ways, Article 15 and auto-prise en charge also 
inspire positive action. Bukavu residents have shown consider-
able creativity and bravery in responding to the many challenges 
insecurity poses. There are, for example, a range of individual 
precautions to avoid everyday insecurity—ranging from avoiding 
to walk alone at night and hiding valuables in specially made 
underwear, to hiring maibobo as body guards and denouncing 
thieves at the risk of them returning to seek revenge.62 The focus 
here is on community and state responses to insecurity.
Community responses 
In Nkafu and Essence, a considerable range of community 
responses to insecurity exists. Some of them are initiated and 
funded by neighbourhood leaders, civil society organizations and 
cadres de base. Others are spontaneous but collective outbursts of 
anger and frustration.
Popular justice is a case of the latter. In the aftermath of former 
Governor Mwando Nsimba’s public speech in the 1980s, justice 
populaire incidents rapidly multiplied across the city. This was 
62   Usalama Project III focus group with women and youth, Essence, 10 and 12 March 
2019; Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019; Usalama Project 
III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 8 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with church secretary, Nkafu, 12 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with sex worker, Essence, 12 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with 
young resident, Essence, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, 
Essence, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with taxi motorcyclist, Essence, 15 
March; Usalama Project III interview with priest, Nkafu, 16 March 2019; Usalama Project 
III interview with cadre de base, Nkafu, 16 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with 
respected resident, Nkafu, 18 March 2019. 
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especially the case in Essence, where the presence of gold traders 
attracted many robbers. After they were caught by residents, 
these thieves were summarily put on trial and violently punished. 
Encouraged by a discourse of auto-prise en charge, these instances 
of popular justice are best understood as acts of reclaiming socio-
political agency.63 
A good example of the important, if tragic, role of mob justice 
in the history of insecurity in Bukavu is an incident still recounted 
by its residents in 2019. The incident involved an army officer 
nicknamed Chuck Norris, who was known in the 1990s for his 
violent harassment of the population in Essence. One day, he 
mistakenly shot an innocent boy in an altercation with one of 
his subordinates. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
It did not take long for a mob to form and start chasing the army 
officer. Running away, the officer shot in the air to deter the 
chasers. They simply counted the bullets out loud and once he 
ran out of ammunition, they beat him to death.64 
This incident marked a turning point in relations between 
Essence and state security services and its history of insecurity 
more generally. Ever since, Essence became known for its siege 
mentality: a strong distrust of police and army services and a will 
to defend themselves. A member of a youth policing group 
63   Usalama Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with civil society member, Essence, 8 March 2109; Usalama Project 
III interview with drug dealer, Essence, 11 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with 
taxi motorcyclist, Essence, 15 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with cadre de 
base, Essence, 25 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with fuel seller, Essence, 31 
March 2019; and Judith Verweijen, ‘The Disconcerting Popularity of Popular In/justice in 
the Fizi/Uvira Region, Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’, International Journal of 
Minority and Group Rights 22 (2015): 335–359.
64   Interview with employee of commune of Ibanda, Ndendere, 28 October 2016; 
Usalama Project III interview with money changer, Essence, 9 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with pickpocket, Essence, 10 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with civil society member, Essence, 17 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with member of youth policing group, 20 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with police officer, Essence, 29 March 2019.
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explains: 
It’s been difficult to arrest people at Essence for a long 
time. That dates back to the death of Chuck Norris. With 
the notoriety this army chief had, nobody could have 
imagined that he could have been stoned to death. That 
instance made Essence a red zone. Since then, it is difficult 
to come and arrest someone in Essence.65
Less violent responses to insecurity consist of neighbourhood 
initiatives driven by civil society, community leaders and cadres 
de base. Destroying abandoned sheds and kiosks, advocating for 
more public lighting, cutting trees to reduce dark corners and 
posting pictures and names of well-known bandits onto walls 
are examples of such measures.66 A more robust strategy is to 
set up local alarm systems—a measure which has been around 
since at least the 1960s. Initiators distribute whistles and vuvuz-
elas (plastic trumpets) at community meetings, or people are 
encouraged to make use of their pots and pans in order to warn 
their neighbours in case of armed robberies. Cadres de base call 
the police as soon as the alarm is set off, although the latter 
frequently intervene much too late. A church secretary says: 
Yes, Nkafu residents take care of themselves. Most of the 
time, it is after the incident that we see authorities arrive 
only to have a look and leave. For the prevention, it is the 
population itself. If thieves enter here, for example, those 
who are next door ring the alarm, they scream but you 
65   Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 17 
March 2019. 
66   Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu and Essence, 8 and 12 March 
2019; Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Nkafu, 13 March 2019.
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won’t see the police.67
When insecurity is high, these alarm systems are often accom-
panied by youth night patrols. Each household makes a small 
contribution to afford coffee, tea and bread for the young patrol-
lers. Sometimes the youth are armed with sticks and stones but 
robbers now often carry guns, making such patrols dangerous 
endeavours. Using language reminiscent of the spirit of auto-prise 
en charge, two youth members of such patrols admit the danger 
despite their bravery. One says, ‘Despite these bullets, we the 
leaders of the quartier, we wake up and make noise because we 
have decided to sacrifice ourselves for our quartier.’ The other 
adds, ‘But we are limited because a person with a gun shooting 
from a hundred metres, and we who have small stones, which 
can merely reach five metres, we are very different.’68
In Essence and Nkafu, the cadres de base discourage youth from 
mounting patrols because of the risks involved.69 Therefore, 
some solicit mixed patrols with the help of the police. A low-level 
urban administrator in Nkafu, however, says that for the police 
to participate, they have to be motivated as well, and even then, 
they can be difficult: ‘Sometimes they are complicated and refuse 
to help us but sometimes they accept to patrol with us. But they 
ask us to give them cigarettes, alcohol and other things. When 
they ask us like that, we are obliged to find something to meet 
67   Usalama Project III interview with church secretary, Nkafu, 12 March 2019. Also: 
Usalama Project III interview with civil society member, Essence, 8 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with priest, Nkafu, 12 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with 
civil society members, Nkafu, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with member 
of youth policing group, Essence, 20 March 2019.
68   Participants in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019. 
69   Usalama Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview 
with former cadre de base, Nkafu, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with priest, 
Nkafu, 16 March 2019. 
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their needs.’70 Such patrols, regardless if mixed or not, are all too 
often reactive and time-limited measures to insecurity: they 
depend on community solidarity and youth determination—a 
fragile basis in a context in which people have to worry first 
about how to make ends meet. 
In some areas, though, such initiatives can be quite successful. 
In late 2018, after the assassination of a well-known money 
changer in one of the wealthier areas in Nkafu, Bugabo I, local 
leaders and respected figures came together to set up a Comité de 
Développement (CdD, development committee), which used to 
exist on each avenue. This committee keeps a fund to which the 
wealthier residents contribute to finance mixed patrols with 
police and support the cadres de base to follow up on security 
incidents. Since then, this avenue seems to be relatively calm.71 
A civil society activist explains the success of Bugabo I by 
stating that it is an area inhabited by people who are born in 
Bukavu or have been living in the city for several decades and 
whose children go to school and university in the city—they thus 
have a stake in the safety and overall well-being of Bukavu. This, 
he says, is simply not the case in much of the rest of Nkafu: 
‘There is no time to think about insecurity if your stomach is 
empty.’72
Bugabo I is a good example of how the degree of security and 
insecurity in Bukavu has become a function of its socio-economic 
70   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019. 
Also: Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Nkafu, 9 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III focus group with women, Essence, 10 March 2019; Usalama Project III focus 
group with youth, Nkafu, 8 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with respected 
resident, Nkafu, 14 March 2019.
71   Usalama Project III interview with Bugabo I resident, Nkafu, 14 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with Bugabo I committee member, Nkafu, 14 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Nkafu, 16 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with committee member, Nkafu, 18 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview 
with civil society members, Ndendere, 26 March 2019.
72   Usalama Project III interview with civil society member of Kadutu, Ndendere, 26 
March 2019.
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context. This context changes from avenue to avenue. Whereas 
wealthier residents can come together to mobilize night patrols 
and fund the police to guard their neighbourhood, poorer neigh-
bours have fewer means to respond to insecurity in a sustained 
and effetive manner.73 Moreover, solidarity and social integration 
matter. Nkafu is a vast quartier, which only started to grow after 
the start of the Congolese wars. Its residents are thus largely 
made up of rural immigrants, which is testing the integration 
and solidarity of communities in the quartier. Less short-lived 
solutions to insecurity, however, do not always have to depend 
on the wealth of a neighbourhood. 
The rise of youth policing groups
In the second half of the 2000s in Essence, an alternative commu-
nity response to rampant insecurity emerged. Facing unchecked 
crime, youth became more directly involved in everyday policing 
by forming their own policing groups. Two have become estab-
lished associations and important actors in the Bukavu security 
landscape: Synérgie des Associations des Jeunes pour l’Education Civique, 
Electorale et la Promotion des Droits de l’Homme au Sud-Kivu–Forces 
Vives (SAJECEK–Forces Vives; Synergy of Youth Asso-ciations 
for Civic and Electoral Education and the Promotion of Human 
Rights in South Kivu–Vital Forces) and Bukavu-Forces Vives, 
which also operates in Nkafu.74
The main work of these two groups consists of arresting—and 
sometimes punishing—criminals. In their early days, they did so 
rather violently, publicly whipping supposed thieves at the Major 
Vangu square. Their ability to find thieves and render quick 
73   Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 14 
March 2019.
74   For a more detailed account, see: Judith Verweijen, Michel Thill and Maarten 
Hendriks, ‘Ambiguous Order: Youth Groups and Urban Policing in the Eastern Congo’, 
Usalama Project III briefing, Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2019.
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justice made them quite popular: they became seen as more 
trustworthy and legitimate than the police. In recent years, their 
violent methods have subsided. Due to their intricate knowledge 
of the neighbourhoods in which they operate, they also occasion-
ally function as informal extensions of the state security 
apparatus, helping police and prosecutors identify and catch 
criminals. As a thief from Essence says, ‘The youth from Forces 
Vives know us well. They know where we live. You can have a 
file with the police. They can come look for you but they won’t 
find you because they don’t know how to locate you. But the 
youth from Forces Vives know our doors. We cannot escape 
them.’75 
Moreover, to gain income, the Forces Vives locate and retrieve 
stolen goods for a fee. In such cases, they do not always, however, 
hand over the thieves to the police, thus becoming partially 
complicit in the economy of insecurity. As a taxi motorcyclist 
complains, ‘People steal in front of the SAJECEK office but they 
don’t react. They only wait for the victim to come and complain 
because that is when they also benefit.’76 For SAJECEK members, 
however, drawing on the discourse of auto-prise en charge, there 
are few alternatives: ‘We know that what we do is illegal. But in 
the face of the insecurity that we suffer, and while the state is 
incapable of putting an end to it, we have to take care of 
75   Usalama Project III interview with pickpocket, Essence, 10 March 2019. Also: 
Usalama Project III focus group with women and youth, Essence, 10 and 12 March 2019; 
Usalama Project interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 8 March 2019. 
76   Usalama Project III interview with taxi motorcyclist, Essence, 15 March 2019. Also: 
Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Essence, 12 March 2019; Usalama Project III 
interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 10 March 2019; Usalama Project 
III interview with drug dealer, Essence, 11 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with 
member of youth policing group, Nkafu, 13 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview 
with police officer, Nkafu, 30 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with fuel seller, 
Essence, 31 March 2019; Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Essence, 2 April 
2019.
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ourselves.’77 
The Forces Vives may be the best known of such youth policing 
groups but there are several other such movements, albeit often 
more fleeting. In Essence, some groups want to replace the Forces 
Vives and bring back public whippings, claiming that insecurity 
has returned due to their abandonment of these practices. At the 
illegal Bondeko market in Nkafu, volunteers wearing yellow 
vests patrol the stands to protect the market women from 
threats. One of them presents his group as follows: ‘We are the 
police without training because we try hard to maintain order in 
all of Bondeko.’78 In return for protection from maibobo and 
thieves, the yellow-vested volunteers charge a daily tax on the 
market women, blurring lines between public and private 
security. At the same time, they also engage in the economy of 
insecurity, recuperating stolen goods to make extra money. 
Youth policing groups exist at the intersections of crime and 
justice, public and private security, and insecurity and security. 
They are thus a highly ambiguous phenomenon.79 State responses 
to insecurity are, perhaps unsurprisingly, equally messy.
State responses to urban insecurity
Formally speaking, addressing insecurity remains the responsi-
bility of the Congolese state, and the police in particular. Every 
so often, when faced with an especially severe crisis of insecu-
rity, the Bukavu governorate takes up that responsibility and 
77   Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 14 
March 2019. 
78   Usalama Project III interview with member of volunteers, Nkafu, 25 March 2019. 
Also: Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Essence, 27 
March 2019. 
79   Maarten Hendriks, ‘The politics of everyday policing in Goma: the case of the Anti-
gang’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 12/2 (2018): 274–289; Helene Maria Kyed, ‘Street 
Authorities: Community Policing in Mozambique and Swaziland’, Political and Legal 
Anthropology Review 41/1 (2018): 19–34.
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announces comprehensive security campaigns. This was the case 
in February 2018, when the provincial security council of relevant 
state authorities together with the cadres de base, announced the 
Tujikinge campaign (let’s defend ourselves). As its name alludes, 
this campaign actively deployed an auto-prise en charge discourse.80
From the beginning, the campaign called on all members of 
society to mobilize against insecurity. First and foremost, it 
involved all major state security actors. During the first months 
of the operation, police, army, intelligence and migration services 
conducted raids and patrols, and set up checkpoints. Civilian 
cooperation was enticed by financially compensating denuncia-
tions of arms caches and criminal hideouts. To receive reliable 
intelligence, the campaign solicited the support of taxi motorcy-
clists and some elements of the Forces Vives as their eyes and ears 
or, in their words, as their éclaireurs (French; scouts) and 
non-apparents (French; invisibles). Several urban authorities, 
including cadres de base, announced their support for the campaign 
but quickly realized that they had to raise their own funds if they 
wanted to contribute. They thus launched their own operations, 
with one district chief calling for information meetings with local 
residents, handing out whistles and even cooperating with his 
Rwandan counterparts to stop bandits fleeing across the border.81
Some initial successes were recorded. Arrested criminals were 
shown to the press and public, and weapons and stolen goods 
were recuperated. Voices of discontent, however, did not take 
long to emerge. In the early stages of the campaign, cases of 
80   For a more detailed account, see: Michel Thill, Gentil Kulimushi and Godefroid 
Muzalia. ‘La campagne Tujikinge et la gouvernance de la sécurité à Bukavu’, Rift Valley 
Institute, 23 July 2019, < http://riftvalley.net/news/une-gouvernance-securitaire-opaque-
le-cas-de-la-campagne-tujikinge-a-bukavu> 
81   Usalama Project III interview with taxi motorcyclists, Ndendere, 11 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Nkafu, 12 March 
2019; Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Nyalukemba, 13 March 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with journalist and taxi motorcyclist, Ndendere, 25 March 
2019.
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justice populaire seemed to multiply as overly eager residents, 
perhaps remembering the words of Governor Mwando Nsimba, 
took Tujikinge too literally. At checkpoints and during raids, 
valuables were stolen and many civilians complained about being 
harassed by state security actors. Worse, the Bukavu Forces Vives 
and members of civil society say that the supposed thieves who 
had been presented to the press had been spotted running around 
freely in the city.82 Meanwhile, other observers cynically remark 
that such campaigns were mere masquerades meant to give 
some politicians an opportunity to position themselves in 
upcoming elections.83 Since the 2018 elections, operations have 
indeed fizzled out. In September 2018, it was in this context that 
only a mere six months after the launch of the campaign, a 
newspaper called Bukavu the DRC capital of insecurity.84 
To some extent, the Tujikinge campaign brings the story of 
insecurity in Bukavu full circle. It is an ambitious state response 
to insecurity that relies on the language of auto-prise en charge to 
get something done but then falls victim to the very effects of its 
own logic. State security services depended on ambiguous urban 
actors such as youth policing groups and taxi motor-cyclists to 
be effective. Some prosecutors and judges let arrested thieves go 
free. Some police officers harassed and stole from those they 
were meant to protect. Some civilians took justice into their own 
hands. Perhaps most tragically—and impressively—a neglected 
and unpaid district chief seemed to have outperformed state 
efforts with his own initiatives. For better or worse, Article 15 
and auto-prise en charge have thus become the pillars of urban 
82   Usalama Project III interview with member of youth policing group, Panzi, 28 
March 219.
83   Steve Mulindwa, ‘ukavu:Des bandits arrêtés dans le cadre de l’opération 
TUJIKINGE circulent librement dans la ville’, Radio Maendeleo, 24 April 2018, <http://
www.radiomaendeleo.info/bukavudes-bandits-arretes-dans-le-cadre-de-loperation-
tujikinge-circulent-librement-dans-la-ville/>.
84   Nsapu, ‘RDC: Bukavu est devenue la capitale de l’insécurité’.
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security governance, the robustness of which unavoidably influ-
ences any initiative to address insecurity. 
responses to urban insecurity 
6. Conclusion and Policy Considerations
The introduction to this report included an assertion by a Congo-
lese policeman that security is a system that changes. In Bukavu, 
economic decline, violent conflict and the state’s retreat from 
public security obligations have resulted in the emergence of a 
system where security and insecurity have become closely linked 
together. In fact, they have become two sides of the same coin.
This system of insecurity has stimulated many forms of 
organized and everyday resistance. These include comprehensive 
state security campaigns, the mobilization of night patrols at 
district and avenue level and the organization of youth into 
policing groups. As well-intentioned as many of these efforts are, 
they can also result in security being undermined. Police regularly 
harass residents for money; judges release gangsters upon 
payment of bribes; youth policing groups cultivate mutually 
beneficial relations with known criminals; and civilians protect 
the thieves from whom they purchase stolen goods. 
Bukavu’s system of insecurity has permeated many levels of 
life. At its heart is the tension between structural forces and the 
agency of the people who are affected by them. This causes the 
system to continually change shape, resulting in an ambiguous 
order where a plurality of actors collaborate and compete to 
achieve the near impossible: to survive, thrive and provide 
security all at once. 
Five considerations follow for those who seek to positively 
influence this system.
Create safe urban spaces
Making urban spaces less accommodating for insecurity is one 
way to tackle the problem. A first step would be a serious invest-
ment in public infrastructure. Almost every resident in Bukavu 
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mentions the lack of public lighting as a major source of day-to-
day insecurity. Similarly, both police and residents cite the bad 
condition or lack of roads, and the resulting inaccessibility of 
certain urban areas, as a major obstacle to a secure environment. 
Finally, drug dens, brothels and ngandas are seen as attracting 
the wrong crowd. Drugs and brothels are illegal in the DRC and 
many ngandas operate without a licence, which should make it 
easy to shut them down. Investing in these low-cost initiatives 
would increase perceived security and, as importantly, rebuild 
much-needed popular trust in state authorities. 
Commit to police reform 
In the Congo, public security and order is the mandate of the 
Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC; Congolese National Police). 
From 2005, the PNC have been in a process of national reform 
towards the adoption of a community policing approach. For a 
time, communes and district chiefs in Bukavu hosted regular 
security meetings that brought together urban authorities, police 
and civil society. Supported by donors, these meetings fostered 
a sense of trust on security-related matters, while civilian leaders 
could hold police and their bourgmestre or chef de quartier account-
able. It also revitalized the crucial role of cadres de base in security. 
At present these meetings are only held periodically and in a 
reactive manner. 
A programme that provides support in the planning of city and 
commune budgets—stressing the importance of security-related 
expenses—could help liberate funds to institutionalize these 
functions. Moreover, Article 15 of the 2013 decree that created 
the CLSP provides for a fund to be established by the provincial 
governor to independently finance activities around security. 
Despite civil society efforts, this fund has never been set up. 
Notwithstanding the risks involved in engaging with security 
sector reform, donors should revisit police reform and contribute 
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to the CLSP fund.85
Mobilize the positive potential of youth
Youth play a crucial role in security initiatives but are also a 
central feature in the landscape of insecurity. Mobilizing the 
positive potential of youth could unlock enormous opportuni-
ties. Much work is already being done in this realm, particularly 
in leadership training, civic participation and education. The 
continued support and partnerships between donors, interna-
tional NGOs and youth organizations in Bukavu could offer 
more opportunities that keep youth away from criminal 
activities.
Several youth organizations already mobilize residents to 
perform salongo—providing free labour once a week for commu-
nity development projects. Such initiatives could be financially 
supported and combined with vocational training, which 
increases the sense of safety in neighbourhood communities. As 
important, it may also provide some youth with an improved 
sense of societal belonging. 
Build on local best practice
There are many existing community responses to insecurity. 
Some of these do work, albeit often only on a temporary basis. 
The more promising initiatives tend to build on existing struc-
tures, such as the Comité de Développement (CdD) at avenue level, 
or the night patrols that were once mobilized by the cades de base 
during the RCD occupation. Such platforms could be incorpo-
rated into decentralized urban administrative structures, giving 
residents and cadres de base the means to mitigate security threats 
85   Michel Thill, Robert Njangala and Josapaht Musamba, ‘Putting everyday police life 
at the centre of reform in Bukavu’, Briefing paper, London: Rift Valley Institute, March 
2018.
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and address problems. To support the activities of these commit-
tees, donors could offer to match the financial contributions 
made by residents and local organizations. 
Fostering bottom-up social inclusion
Tackling insecurity requires a society-wide response. Given the 
relative success of local initiatives, helping to foster a bottom-up 
approach—as exemplified by the CdD—could be the most effec-
tive role that donors can play. As seen with the police reform, 
creating spaces of encounters between state and society is a 
significant and feasible first step in fostering a true sense of 
social inclusion and in giving Bukavu's residents a meaninful 
stake in their city's security.86 
86   Usalama Project III interview with cadre de base, Essence, 13 March 2019; interview 
with commune of Ibanda employee, Ndendere, 21 October 2016 and 30 October 2016.
Glossary of Acronyms, Words and Phrases
AFDL Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la 
libération du Congo/Zaïre (Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo/Zaire)
auto-prise en charge (French) taking care of oneself; a popular 
phrase used in various contexts but 
mostly refers to taking matters of security 
and justice in one’s  
own hands 
bourgmestre  (French) sub-mayor, an officially elected 
urban administrative position heading the 
commune 
cadres de base  low-level urban administrators
CAID  Cellule d’Analyses des Indica teurs de   
 Développement 
CdD Comité de Développement (Development 
Committee); a meeting platform of 
respected voices in the neighbourhood to 
discuss urgent matters (e.g. security, 
hygiene, development) and mobilize 
community responses to them 
chef de quartier  district chief; an official position in the 
urban administrative structure and 
officially appointed by the elected 
bourgmestre
CLSP Comité Local pour la Sécurité de Proximité 
(Local Committee for Community 
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Security); a security exchange, coordina-
tion, analysis and accountability platform 
bringing together civil society, police and 
urban authorities commune level
commune  (French) the largest administrative entity 
of the city
coop  abbreviation of the English word ‘cooper-
ation’; refers to a variety of mutually 
beneficial arrangements between crimi-
nals and police
débrouillez-vous (French) fend for yourself  
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
justice populaire (French) popular justice
kabanga  from the Mashi word ‘mubanga’; a heavy-
duty cord; refers to a criminal practice in 
which a cord is used to strangle victims to 
death
maibobo (Swahili) street children
maison de tolérance  (French) house of tolerance; commonly  
 refers to a brothel
nganda (Swahili) bar or pub
nyumba kumi  (Swahili) ten houses
PNC Police Nationale Congolaise (Congolese   
 National Police)
quartier  urban administrative entity below the 
commune level and above cellule and 
avenue levels
glossary of acronyms, worDs anD phrases 
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RCD  Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie 
(Congolese Rally for Democracy)
rapportage (French) reporting; refers to a practice 
within the police (but also other state 
institutions) whereby officers are 
obligated to generate revenue for their 
hierarchies; can lead to the widespread 
harassment of civilians
SAJECEK Synérgie des Associations des Jeunes pour 
l’Education Civique, Electorale et la Promotion 
des Droits de l’Homme au Sud-Kivu/Forces 
Vives (Synergy of Youth Associations for 
Civic and Electoral Education and the 
Promotion of Human Rights in South 
Kivu); Essence-based community devel-
opment organization, with a youth 
security branch 
salongo (Swahili) providing free labour once a 
week on a voluntary basis for community 
development projects
snith (Swahili) an opioid
SSAPR Security Sector Accountability and Police 
Reform
Tujikinge  (Swahili) let’s defend ourselves
vols à mains armées (French) thefts with an armed hand; refers 
to armed robberies
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Ambiguous Order: Youth 
Groups and Urban Policing in 
the Congo
This briefing examines the struc-
ture, operations and social function 
of youth policing groups in Bukavu, 
Goma and Uvira.
Un microcosme de militarisation: 
Conflit, gouvernance et 
mobilization armée en  
territoire d’Uvira
Ce rapport analyse la militarisation  
en territoire d’Uvira et la manière 
dont celle-ci façonne les rapports 
entre conflits locaux, gouvernance  
et mobilisation armée.
Contesting Authority:  
Armed rebellion and military 
fragmentation in Walikale and 
Kalehe, North and South Kivu
This report analyses the involve-
ment of armed groups in public 
life in the territories of Kalehe and 
Walikale, which has led to further 
militarization and fragmentation of 
public space and social interactions.
Recycling Rebels: 
Demobilization in the Congo
This briefing analyses why and how 
previous DDR processes have failed, 
and provides a sketch of the current 
state of affairs and future prospects 
for demobilization.
Comprendre la prolifération 
des groupes armés dans l’est 
du Congo
Ce briefing examine les principaux 
mécanismes qui sous-tendent la 
prolifération des groups armés dans 
l’est du Congo pour venir à bout  
de cette problématique.
South Kivu: Identity, territory 
and power in the eastern Congo
This report outlines the historical 
dynamics behind the armed move-
ments in South Kivu, focusing on 
the period before and leading up to 
the First Congo War. 
Nord-Kivu: Contexte historique 
du conflit dans la province du 
Nord-Kivu, à l’est du Congo
Ce rapport résume le contexte 
historique de la profusion des 
groupes armés qui ont surgit dans 
les deux dernières décennies dans  
la province du Nord-Kivu en RDC.
The national army and armed 
groups in the eastern Congo: 
Untangling the Gordian knot  
of insecurity
The final report of phase I of the 
Usalama Project presents con-
clusions from 18 months of field 
research on the national army and 
armed groups in the eastern DRC 
focussing on armed mobilization in 
North and South Kivu, the FARDC 
and a critical review of past and 
current efforts in the field of de-
mobilization and army reform.
The Ebb and Flow of 
Stabilization in the Congo
This briefing examines the mixed 
approach of MONUSCO towards 
the implementation of the I4S and 
suggests that it would be appro-
priate for the UN mission and its 
partners to continue to advance  
this framework.
A System of Insecurity: Understanding Urban 
Violence and Crime in Bukavu examines the role 
of state and non-state actors in the provision of 
security, and citizens’ perceptions of, experiences 
with and responses to insecurity in Bukavu, the 
capital of South Kivu province in the eastern Congo. 
Facing growing urban insecurity, the residents of 
Bukavu have taken matters into their own hands. 
Improvising, fending for yourself (débrouillez-
vous) and taking care of oneself (auto-prise en 
charge) have become logics of personal action. 
This has produced an ambiguous order in which a 
plurality of actors compete to achieve the near 
impossible: to survive, thrive and provide security 
all at once.
